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In this paper, I explain the kinematics of non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement. This occurs 
when one speaker has greater control in the joint activity of pairing contents with words in 
a context. I argue that some forms of non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement are deeply 
worrying. When we pay attention to certain power imbalances in such exchanges, we are 
able to locate a distinctive wrong. This occurs when a speaker possesses illegitimate control 
in metalinguistic disagreement owing to the operation of identity prejudice. I call this 
metalinguistic injustice. The wrong involves restricting a speaker from participating in the 
processes that determine the epistemic/linguistic resources of a conversation, and/or 




Suppose you’re at a bar. You overhear the following disagreement:  
 
Madison: This martini is fabulous! 
Mindi: That’s not a martini, it has vodka in it. 
 
You ask yourself: What’s happening in this dispute? Do the disputants agree on what martinis are 
but disagree as to whether the drink in front them counts as one? Or are they disputing what the 
criteria of martinis should be? Listening a little while longer you hear the exchange unfold: 
 
Mindi: Real martinis have only gin and vermouth.  
Madison: Come on, almost all bars make martinis with vodka.  
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From this, you infer that because the disputants are trading reasons to accept one set of criteria 
(i.e. ingredients) over another, the disagreement must be of the second kind. Another way to put 
it is this: Madison and Mindi are arguing over which content ought to be expressed by the shared 
term ‘martini.’ They disagree as to what the relevant word-content pair should be. Madison 
appeals to common usage; Mindi appeals to historical usage.  
 
This kind of dispute has been the focus of much analysis in recent time.1 It is called metalinguistic 
disagreement. And, it is a common form of exchange in everyday life. Many theorists have argued 
for the importance of pursuing such disagreement (Plunkett and Sundell 2013; Sterken 2019; 
Davies 2019; Cantalamessa 2019). However, I shall argue that much of this literature seems to 
presuppose that exchanges over word-content pairs take place under ideal or near-ideal conditions. 
This obscures our effort to understand the ways that metalinguistic disagreements often play out. 
After all, such exchanges regularly, if not always, take place within real-world power structures. 
Thus, failing to account for the role of power in metalinguistic disagreement is a setback in social 
justice theorizing. We miss out on identifying and explaining the challenges those face in 
advocating for or resisting particular word-content pairs; especially those that matter for 
marginalized experience.  
 
This paper has two motivations. First, it sets out to explain the critically under-theorized 
kinematics of non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement. In particular, I will focus on non-ideal 
metalinguistic negotiation. To separate metalinguistic disagreement from metalinguistic 
negotiation, I will understand the latter as a type of disagreement in which speakers aim to 
complete the joint activity of pairing contents with words – this is by adopting the same 
understanding of a term, rather than just dropping the conversation or changing the subject. The 
purpose is to come to a conclusion about the content a word will express in a context. 2 In non-
ideal cases, one speaker has more control in this process.3 Consider an example. 
 
Suppose that Fig and Fil are both chefs, deciding on the items that should be on a menu. Fig is 
the head-chef, Fil is the sous-chef. Fil believes that animals aren’t food, and Fig thinks otherwise: 
                                                
1 See: Plunkett and Sundell (2013), Marques (2017), Thomasson (2020), Sterken (2019), Cantalamessa 
(2019), Hansen (2019), Mühlebach (2019), Davies (2019).  
2 This isn’t strictly the definition provided by Plunkett and Sundell (2013). Nevertheless, the primary 
cases they explore lend itself to this interpretation. I defend this idea in §2.   
3 This is not the goal for all power-infected metalinguistic disagreements. In cases of gaslighting, a 
dominant speaker might simply want to confuse his target by provoking her to question the appropriateness 




Fil: Cows aren’t food. They’re persons, after all.  
Fig: Of course cows are food. Look around you, they’re on menus everywhere.  
 
At this point, all seems well in this back-and-forth: Fig and Fil are engaging in a paradigm 
metalinguistic disagreement. However, imagine how the exchange might unfold.  
 
Fig: I’m sick of your animal advocacy. In this restaurant, cows are food!  
Fil: Yes, chef.  
 
We can see that there is a clear difference in what Fig and Fil are able to achieve in this 
disagreement. Fig has more influence in the joint activity of pairing contents with words in virtue 
of her social position in the context. An explanation of this difference in control over word-
content pairs has not been given proper treatment in the existing literature. And the significance 
of this must be stressed. Given that we are embedded in systems of hierarchy, non-ideal 
metalinguistic disagreements are common; plausibly more common than ideal exchanges. Thus, 
failure to account for non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement is a failure to explain how 
metalinguistic disagreements tend to play out in the real world.   
 
Not all non-ideal metalinguistic disagreements are ideological. Despite being hierarchical, some 
involve an unequal but non-problematic distribution of control over word-content pair 
determination. 4  However, some non-ideal cases are deeply worrying. This is the second 
motivation of the paper. I will argue that when we pay attention to certain power imbalances in 
metalinguistic disagreement, we are able to locate a distinctive moral wrong. This occurs when a 
speaker possesses illegitimate control in metalinguistic disagreement owing to the operation of 
identity prejudice in the context. I call this metalinguistic injustice. It can take the form of an 
epistemic injustice, a linguistic injustice, or both. The wrong involves restricting a speaker from 
participating in the processes that determine the epistemic or linguistic resources of a 
conversation, and/or undermining a speaker’s ability to affect metalinguistic outcomes.5  
 
                                                
4 Deference to expertise is a clear case. If an attending doctor is having a metalinguistic disagreement 
with an intern, it seems that the attending doctor should, at least in an epistemic sense, have greater control.  
5 My focus in this paper is on identity-prejudicial wrongs. I leave it open as to how the non-identity 
related wrongs of particular forms of non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement should be cashed out.  
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Uncovering metalinguistic injustice sheds important light on the difficulties that marginalized 
speakers face in metalinguistic discourse. While there might be reasons for some to pursue 
metalinguistic disagreement, such reasons aren’t always, if ever, available to marginalized speakers. 
 
2. Metalinguistic Disagreement 
 
When I apply a context-sensitive expression to an object, I can do one of two things: I can rely on 
the context to make sense of the properties of the object, or I can rely on the properties of the 
object to make sense of the context. Plunkett and Sundell (2013) call the latter metalinguistic usage. 
When interlocutors exchange conflicting metalinguistic usages, they are engaging in metalinguistic 
disagreement. We might ask: What reasons does one have to pursue disagreement of this kind? Of 
course, there are many. I will take time to explore three prominent reasons, none of which are 
essential to metalinguistic disagreement. 
 
One reason to pursue metalinguistic disagreement is to complete the joint activity of pairing 
contents with words. Call this metalinguistic negotiation. This isn’t strictly the definition provided 
by Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 3). For Plunkett and Sundell, metalinguistic negotiation just is 
metalinguistic disagreement as I have described it above. Nevertheless, a distinction is warranted. 
After all, sometimes in an exchange of metalinguistic usages, speakers do not have the goal of 
pairing contents with words. For instance, imagine two philosophers who simply want to assess 
the relative merits of alternative contents that could be expressed by ‘woman’ without coming to a 
conclusion. Moreover, the definition of metalinguistic negotiation that I have offered seems to 
appear implicitly in Plunkett and Sundell’s discussion of a fictional disagreement between Oscar 
and Callie over the content that should be expressed by ‘spicy.’ They argue the following:  
 
Why would Oscar and Callie consider it worth their time to engage in such a disagreement, 
when they already agree on what the chili actually tastes like? ... [B]ecause how we use words 
matters. For Oscar and Callie, as for many of us, an agreement amongst all the cooks in the 
kitchen that the chili can be described as ‘spicy’ plays an important role in... decision-making 
about whether to add more spice (2013, 15). 
 
In this case, the reason for pursuing metalinguistic disagreement is not simply for the sake of 
exchanging metalinguistic usages. Rather, the goal is to complete the process of pairing contents 
with words. Particular to this example, it seems that the speakers have the goal of completing 
 5 
metalinguistic disagreement in order coordinate or cooperate on the use of an expression, which 
will achieve a practical end that both speakers care about.  
 
In this paper, I will be primary concerned with metalinguistic negotiation as I have defined it. 
However, I am not going to discuss cases in which speakers aim to achieve consensus in order to 
realise a shared practical interest. Moreover, I will not be so interested in cases where the goal 
metalinguistic negotiation, for both speakers, is to cooperate on the use of an expression. Instead, 
I will focus on situations in which the need for resolving metalinguistic disagreement is forced or 
imposed onto an interlocutor; typically, to realise an end, practical or otherwise, that only one 
speaker wants to establish. This I will explore in §5.  
 
Other theorists have offered alterative reasons to pursue metalinguistic disagreement. Such 
reasons won’t be essential to this paper. Nevertheless, I will spend time explaining them since my 
discussion sheds light on difficulties for metalinguistic disagreement broadly conceived. 
 
Alex Davies (2019) argues that not all metalinguistic disagreements are deliberate exchanges that 
aim at resolution. Often, such disagreements are used as a platform on which identity is 
displayed. When a word is context-sensitive, or polysemous, there are several criteria that one 
could use in a context. Engaging in metalinguistic disagreement, where one advocates for one or 
more criteria, serves as a means of ‘giving off’ information that isn’t merely about getting an 
audience to recognise an intention to use a word in a certain way. Thus, for Davies, identities can 
be displayed through disagreement insofar as information can be conveyed about the social 
category to which one belongs, or through the performance of a ritual that expresses shared 
identity (ibid., 11). 
 
Another reason why one might pursue metalinguistic disagreement is for the purpose of 
prompting an audience to counterfactually reflect on extant word-content pairs. Rachel Sterken 
(2019), in her advocacy for this position, responds to the following challenge: Deploying an 
improved word-content pair, a product of conceptual engineering, will hamper effective 
communication since the use of such a pair is a linguistic transgression – it involves speaking outside 
the language of a community.6 However, Sterken argues that this is a feature of ameliorative 
analysis, not a bug. We needn’t worry about deploying revised word-content pairs since it serves as 
a linguistic disruption, unsettling common ground so as to cause an audience to reflect on their 
linguistic decisions. The hope is that this will constitute a transformative communicative disruption. 
                                                
6 Jennifer Saul (2006) has raised this concern for Haslanger’s ameliorative definition of woman.  
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The hearer reflects on the ameliorated word-content pair, recognizes it as a viable alternative, and 
sees it as an improvement. Elizabeth Amber Cantalamessa (2019) argues for something similar. 
However, Cantalamessa does not think that all disruptions must aim at causing another to adopt 
an ameliorated word-content pair. One can simply encourage an audience to reassess their 
confidence in existing ones.  
 
I take such practical, social, and political reasons to be appealing. At the same time, however, I 
recognise that these reasons are not wholly sensitive to the realities in which metalinguistic 
disagreements tend to take place. Each appears to presuppose something about the participants to 
metalinguistic disagreement, and the social environment in which they are embedded. 
Specifically, the presupposition is that metalinguistic disagreement takes place under ideal or near 
ideal conditions: 
 
Ideal Metalinguistic Disagreement: A metalinguistic disagreement that takes place between S 
and T, such that S and T (1) are metalinguistic peers with (2) a high degree of local metalinguistic 
agency.  
 
This is a mouthful. In §3, I will take time explicating the relevant concepts needed to understand 
this definition: metalinguistic move, metalinguistic agency, and metalinguistic peerhood. Further, in §4, I 
will show that not all metalinguistic disagreements are ideal. Many, if not most, are non-ideal:  
 
Non-Ideal Metalinguistic Disagreement: A metalinguistic disagreement that takes place 
between S and T, such that either S or T (1) are not metalinguistic peers, or (2) at least one does 
not have a high degree of local metalinguistic agency. 
 
A note before I continue. I want to make it clear that I am not suggesting that each of the 
foregoing reasons cannot be present in non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement. My point is simply 
that there is a critical omission of discussion from theorists working on metalinguistic 
disagreement about the ways in which the kinematics of such disagreements is often influenced by 











An action counts as a move in an activity when it contributes to that activity (McGowan 2019, 
86). The activity under discussion is metalinguistic disagreement. Thus, a metalinguistic move (m-
move) is a conversational move that counts as a contribution to metalinguistic disagreement. Such 
moves involve two features: type and impression. An m-move type is the kind of speech act it is; the 
illocutionary force of a metalinguistic speech act. The impression of an m-move is the degree to 
which the speech act contributes to metalinguistic disagreement; its perlocutionary effect. Let’s 
first explore the former. 
 
Metalinguistic speech acts, or m-move types, are the kinds of speech acts one can perform in a 
metalinguistic disagreement. To date, no one has offered an exhaustive taxonomy of this category 
of speech acts. However, there are some examples. Nat Hansen has brought to light a range of m-
move types that fall under the banner metalinguistic proposals: A speech act, which is a sub-category 
of advisories, where a speaker intends for an audience to come to have a reason to use an 
expression in a certain way (2019, 1). There could be others. Metalinguistic assertions could be 
understood as speech that involves asserting that certain content is paired with a word as if it were 
true (e.g., ‘Non-human animals are not food’). Metalinguistic questions could be understood as 
speech that involves asking which content is paired with a word. And it is plausible that 
metalinguistic speech acts are often indirect. After all, some speech acts can have two illocutionary 
forces.7 When someone asserts, ‘Non-human animals aren’t food,’ this could be understood as an 
object-level assertion and a meta-level proposal, or request, or demand, etc. for the use a word in a 
context.   
 
Proposals, it seems, do not require holding a certain kind of authority to be felicitous. Plausibly, 
however, the felicitous performance of other m-moves depends on contingent environmental 
facts, such as having authority over a hearer.8 According to Nat Hansen, metalinguistic directives are 
one such category (2019, 3). Within the category of directives, there are: metalinguistic requirements, 
speech that requires a hearer to use a word-content pair; metalinguistic prohibitives, speech that forbids 
a hearer from using a certain word-content pair; and metalinguistic permissives, speech that allows a 
hearer to use a word-content pair. (ibid., 3). Despite this, it is unclear that we need to make a 
                                                
7 For a detailed analysis of indirect speech acts, see Jörg Meibauer (2019).  
8 Making them a sub-category of authoritative illocutions (Langton 1993, 305).  
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strong commitment to authority being a constitutive condition for such speech acts. Perhaps 
someone without authority could felicitously perform a metalinguistic directive. However, those 
without authority will typically not be able to have a desired effect on conversation. Authority 
might have more to do conversational outcomes rather than the kind of speech act one can 
perform. This takes us to the impression of an m-move. 
 
The impression of an m-move is the degree to which the move contributes to the activity of 
metalinguistic disagreement. This is roughly the perlocutionary effect on conversation about 
word-content pairs. And the degree to which an m-move contributes to metalinguistic 
disagreement depends on the type of disagreement in question. For metalinguistic negotiation, 
the impression of an m-move is its contribution to resolving a dispute; for identity-display, the 
impression of an m-move is its contribution to having one’s identity recognised; for linguistic 
disruption, the impression of an m-move is its contribution to convincing another to (minimally) 
downgrade their confidence in an extant word-content pair. 
 
My primary interest is in the relationship between authority and impression (i.e., perlocutionary 
effects of m-moves on metalinguistic disagreement). I won’t take a stance on whether certain m-
moves require authority to be felicitously performed. Rather, I accept that such moves might 
require authority, but nevertheless my concern is with the impact one can make on conversational 
outcomes. 
 
To see the distinction between type and impression more clearly, think back to the exchange 
between Fil and Fig. Let’s imagine Fil believes that, in the broader linguistic community, ‘food’ 
should be paired with content that excludes non-human animals. Fil also takes the moralised, 
ameliorated ‘food’-content pair to make sense of his social identity (i.e. vegan). This informs the 
type of the m-moves that Fil wants to make (i.e. metalinguistic proposals) and their intended 
impression. He wants Fig to know that he is vegan; he wants Fig to downgrade her confidence in 
the extant, less moralized ‘food’-content pair; and he has beliefs about the sort of m-moves that 
will resolve the disagreement in his favour. 
 
Recall how the exchange unfolded. Fed up with Fil’s animal advocacy, Fig says, ‘In my restaurant, 
cows are food!’ We can see that this type of utterance is a metalinguistic requirement: Fig has 
performed a speech act requiring Fil to use a specific ‘food’-content pair. And the impression is 
strong. The possibility of losing his job means that Fil must now use a specific ‘food’-content pair, 
at least in the restaurant. Fig has made a profound impact on conversational outcomes. She has 
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exercised power to affect the character and direction of conversation in a way that is less available 
–  if available at all – to Fil. 
 
With the concept of m-move on the table, let’s introduce metalinguistic agency (m-agency) and 
metalinguistic peerhood (m-peerhood). 
 
3.2. M-Agency  
 
M-agency is a scalar concept. It refers to the m-moves one can perform and the overall impression 
of such moves. There are a number of ways that m-agency can be affected. One can have more m-
agency in virtue of being able to perform more moves or being able to perform moves that leave a 
stronger impression. One can have less m-agency in virtue of being able to perform fewer moves or 
being able to perform moves that leave a weaker impression.9 We might ask: more or less relative to 
what?  
 
One answer is that the degree of m-agency one possesses is determined by the type and impression 
of m-moves one can perform relative to an interlocutor. Call this local m-agency. Consider the 
foregoing exchange. Fig can perform m-moves with a stronger impression, relative to Fil. She’s the 
boss, he is the subordinate. 
 
Another answer is that the degree of m-agency one possesses is determined by the type and 
impression of m-moves one can make relative to a range of contexts. Here, m-agency concerns what 
one can do throughout social space. It refers to the m-moves a speaker can perform, and the 
impression of such moves, across a set of possible and actual conversations, and in virtue of which 
variables (e.g. gender, race, etc.) one is enabled or constrained. Call this global m-agency.  
 
Local and global m-agency are explanatorily interdependent. We cannot make sense of the typical 
range and impression of m-moves that a speaker can make without having a sense of what the 
speaker can do relative to a specific interlocutor; and we cannot make sense of a speaker’s global 
m-agency by examining a specific conversation alone. Moreover, one’s local m-agency may not 
always reflect what one can typically achieve in disagreement. There are times at which one might 
strong-arm their way into a dominant metalinguistic position, but this would be unusual across 
the board. 
                                                
9 How should we understand the m-agency of someone has the ability to perform fewer m-moves, but 
with a stronger impression? I leave this question open.  
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I am interested in what one can do in a specific conversation. For this reason, my interest lies in 
local m-agency. However, I am also concerned with what it is in virtue of that one’s local m-agency 
is enabled or constrained. An examination of this requires understanding broader social practices 
that influence conversational kinematics. Specifically, I am interested in the role that identity 
prejudice plays in shaping the character and direction of metalinguistic disagreement. Thus, I am 
also interested in global m-agency. If identity prejudice plays a role in metalinguistic disagreement, 




M-peerhood is specific to a conversation. It is a feature of metalinguistic disagreement when 
interlocutors have available to them the ability to perform the same range of m-moves (or roughly 
the same), with a similar degree of impression. In other words, participants to metalinguistic 
disagreement are m-peers when there is no m-move10 that one participant can perform that the 
other cannot, and neither participant can leave a stronger impression with the same m-move. 
Further, m-peerhood does not assume a degree of m-agency possessed by interlocutors. 
Participants to metalinguistic disagreement can have low levels of local m-agency yet still be m-
peers. 
 
4. Ideal and Non-Ideal 
 
Earlier, I suggested that the reasons offered in existing literature as to why one might pursue 
metalinguistic disagreement are not wholly sensitive to the realities in which metalinguistic 
disagreements tend to take place. The kinds of metalinguistic disagreements commonly explored 
are those that ideal or near ideal. We are now in a position to properly understand what this 
means:  
 
Ideal Metalinguistic Disagreement: A metalinguistic disagreement that takes place between S 
and T, such that S and T (1) are m-peers with (2) a high degree of local m-agency. 
 
Put differently: Metalinguistic disagreement is ideal when participants to conversation can make 
the same extensive range of m-moves with the ability to leave (roughly) the same impression on 
conversation with the performance of such moves. Why think that theorists presuppose this?  
                                                
10 Or no importantly different m-move.  
 11 
 
Consider metalinguistic negotiation. Take an example that is representative of the paradigm cases 
that interest Plunkett and Sundell (2013). Suppose two friends are arguing over the status of a 
jacket: 
 
George: That jacket isn’t smart casual. Black is too formal. 
Kelly: But it doesn’t even have shoulder pads! 
 
We can see that the friends are not arguing over facts about the jacket – they agree on what it 
looks like. Instead, the dispute concerns whether the jacket should count as smart casual. George 
believes that because the jacket is black, it is too formal; Kelly believes that this isn’t a problem 
because it lacks shoulder pads. And, in this case, George and Kelly are aiming at consensus. Kelly 
will wear the jacket depending on what is decided. 
 
What makes this exchange ideal? First, George and Kelly are m-peers. There is no m-move, or no 
importantly different m-move, that is only available to either George or Kelly; and both can 
perform such moves with a similar degree of impression on conversation. 11 Second, George and 
Kelly have a high degree of local m-agency. Both are able to perform a wide range of m-moves, 
with a strong impression, because the conversation is between friends (and vice versa).12 
 
Not all metalinguistic disagreements are this pleasant. Each condition can fail. Sometimes 
speakers are not m-peers; and sometimes a speaker does not enjoy high local m-agency. Further, 
such failures are often interrelated. The fact that speakers are not m-peers can mean that the local 
m-agency of one party to conversation is severely constrained. To see this, recall the exchange 
between chefs: 
 
Fil: Cows aren’t food. They’re persons, after all.  
Fig: Of course they’re food! Look around you; they’re on menus everywhere. 
 
At this point, the interaction appears to be ideal. Fig and Fil seem like m-peers and both seem to 
enjoy high-levels of local m-agency. However, remember how the disagreement unfolded:  
 
Fig: I’m sick of your animal advocacy. In this restaurant, cows are food!  
                                                
11 Some friends may not be m-peers, but a typical friendship involves the ability to freely express oneself.  
12 There could be m-moves that are inappropriate for George and Kelly to perform owing to their 
friendship, such as metalinguistic directives.  
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Fil: Yes, chef. 
 
This reveals something important: Fig and Fil are not m-peers. That is, Fig is able to have a more 
profound impact on the outcome of disagreement over which ‘food’-content pair will be operative 
in the context. In other words, Fig can perform a metalinguistic directive that will greatly affect 
the character and direction of the disagreement. One consequence of Fig’s speech is that it 
delimits the local m-agency of Fil.13 He is unable to freely express attitudes about his preferred 
‘food’-content pair without the risk of punishment. In sum, the joint activity of pairing contents 
with words is heavily skewed in Fig’s favor. 14 
 
This example shows that the conditions for ideal metalinguistic disagreement can fail. The 
speakers are not m-peers; and at least one speaker does not enjoy high local m-agency. From this, 
we can define non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement as follows: 
 
Non-Ideal Metalinguistic Disagreement:  A metalinguistic disagreement that takes place 
between S and T, such that either S and T (1) are not m-peers, or (2) at least one does not have 
high local m-agency.15 
 
Metalinguistic disagreements are a feature of everyday life. And given that power structures dictate 
almost all areas of our social existence, non-ideal exchanges are plausibly more common than 
ideal ones. The case above might not strike one as particularly important. And it must be made 
clear that not all non-ideal metalinguistic negotiations are unjust. Some involve a fair but unequal 
distribution of control over the joint activity of pairing contents with words. Perhaps this is even 
true in the foregoing case. However, there are many instances of non-ideal metalinguistic 
disagreement to which we should be especially attentive. Consider the following:  
 
Woman: You brushed up against my butt, that’s sexual harassment!  
Man: Don’t be so sensitive, that’s way too trivial to count. 
 
This disagreement concerns the content that should be expressed by ‘sexual harassment.’ And we 
should be deeply worried about how exchanges of this kind unfold. Settling on a ‘sexual 
                                                
13 Though speakers may not be m-peers, both could nevertheless enjoy high-levels of local m-agency.  
14 Further, Fil cannot (easily) display his identity nor attempt a linguistic disruption without risking his 
job. 
15  This definition is inclusively disjunctive. And, the disjuncts are scalar, which means that a 
metalinguistic disagreement can be more or less non-ideal.  
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harassment’-content pair has significant practical and psychological consequences. If the man is 
able to have his preferred word-content pair accepted by the woman, certain things follow. The 
woman must update her belief that sexual harassment didn’t occur. She might feel the need to 
apologise for accusing the man of sexual harassment. She might second-guess herself when 
touched again. She might feel over-sensitive, hysterical, and paranoid. She might force herself to 
work in an unsafe environment. Etc.  
 
The task of the rest of this paper is to examine cases of non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement that 
are unjust. In particular, I will explore the role of power and identity in determining who has 
greater local m-agency in a context. I will argue that the joint activity of pairing contents with 
words can be corrupted by the operation of identity prejudice. 
 
What is identity prejudice? Ordinary understanding tells us that ‘prejudice’ is an aspect of 
individual psychology. People are prejudiced when they have an unfounded attitude. This over-
psychologizes what is a more useful concept. Prejudice, as I will understand it, is a property of 
social environments. It is a feature of social structure. And it involves how one’s actions and 
thoughts are enabled or constrained in virtue of belonging to a particular social category.16 Identity 
prejudice, then, is a structural phenomenon in which one’s actions and thoughts are enabled or 
constrained owing to the identity category to which one belongs. This includes gender, race, 
ability, class, etc. For example, think of a predominantly Black neighbourhood in which there is a 
non-accidental absence of polling booths for a presidential election. This is a racist social 
environment that is prejudiced against a particular identity category (i.e., Black Americans). Thus, 
when I say that I am interested in exploring the role that identity prejudice plays in metalinguistic 
negotiation, I am not (just) interested in the attitudes of bad eggs. I am concerned with properties 
of the external world.17 
 
A final note before I continue. It is plausible that an illegitimate difference in m-agency can be 
unjust, unfair, harmful, wrongful, etc. without involving identity prejudice. Given this, I want to 
explicitly state that my interest is in forms of identity-based oppression. I leave it open as to how 




                                                
16 Kate Manne (2018) says something similar in her account of misogyny.  
17 This comes close to Fricker’s notion of structural identity prejudice (2007, 155).  
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5. Power, Asymmetry, and Situatedness 
 
Going forward, I will focus on non-ideal metalinguistic negotiation. In particular, I will examine 
situations in which the need to complete metalinguistic disagreement is forced or imposed onto a 
marginalized speaker.18  
 
5.1. Metalinguistic Power  
 
Metalinguistic negotiation, as I have understood it, involves speakers aiming to complete the joint 
activity of pairing contents with words. Moreover, metalinguistic negotiations can be (more or 
less) ideal or non-ideal. I will focus on non-ideal metalinguistic negotiation. Specifically, I am 
interested in what makes metalinguistic negotiation non-ideal and whether this can be unjust.  
 
In the joint activity of pairing contents with words, one speaker can have more or less control 
over this process. Often this control is not equally distributed across speakers. One can have 
greater influence over the content that a word will express in a context. This is the hallmark of 
non-ideal metalinguistic negotiation. However, this difference in control can be innocent. Not all 
non-ideal metalinguistic negotiations with unequal control are unfair. After all, we should expect 
a speaker to defer to another on the grounds of epistemic expertise – it seems that an intern 
ought to accept the preferred word-content pair of an attending doctor, at least under normal 
conditions.  
 
Despite this, unequal control in metalinguistic negotiation is often a function of being situated in 
unjust systems of dominance and subordination, such as hierarchical relations between members 
of certain identity groups (e.g., White/Black). When one has greater control in the joint activity 
of pairing contents with words in virtue of belonging to an identity group in a position of unjust 
dominance over the identity group of an interlocutor, then this control is illegitimate. Call this 
metalinguistic power. 19 Metalinguistic power is the possession of unjust control in metalinguistic 
negotiation that is a function of interacting parties from social categories implicated in oppressive 
social relations. To explore this further, let’s return to the foregoing example:  
 
Woman: You brushed up against my butt, that’s sexual harassment!  
                                                
18 To reiterate, the aim to complete the joint activity of pairing contents with words is not always shared 
by speakers in power-infected metalinguistic disagreement. See Podosky (2020) on what he calls ‘second 
order gaslighting.’   
19 I am using ‘power’ as power-over (Weber 1978).  
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Man: Don’t be so sensitive, that’s way too trivial to count.  
 
To reiterate, this disagreement concerns the content that should be expressed by ‘sexual 
harassment.’ The man thinks that his intentional action isn’t sexual harassment; the woman 
thinks that it is. Suppose the man gets his way in this exchange. I argue that we can understand 
this as occurring in virtue of the man having metalinguistic power over the woman; a power 
derived from the operation of identity prejudice in the context. But to see this more clearly, we 
need to know about the social environment in which the exchange takes place.20 
 
5.2. Social Environments  
 
A social environment is a network of interrelated and regular patterns of coordinated social 
behaviour (Podosky 2020). Such patterns depend on the culturally available information that 
agents draw on, such as tropes, narratives, social meanings, schemas, roles, etc. This information 
frames expectation, and serves to stabilise behaviour by providing rules that govern social 
interaction. Agents rely on such information to render intelligible experience, which then 
facilitates intentional engagement and coordination with others and surroundings. Moreover, 
social environments can be unjust. This occurs when the extant patterns of coordinated behavior 
unfairly privilege some and subordinate others. Consider an example.  
 
During a visit to the hospital, a woman finds that her testimony is not being taken seriously, 
leading to a misdiagnosis. This owes to the salience of the schema ‘woman’ that triggers 
prejudicial stereotypes associated with women, such as being ‘too sensitive.’ That is, the doctor 
engages in a pernicious pattern of deflating his assessment of the woman’s credibility by drawing 
on defective culturally available information which he uses to make sense of the situation, and to 
guide his decision-making practices. 
 
With respect to the sexual harassment case above, we can tell a similar identity prejudicial story. 
Let’s imagine that when the woman accuses the man of sexual harassment, she does so in the 
context of a male dominated workplace, situated in a patriarchal social environment. Here, 
gender schemas are salient: A woman has accused a man of sexual harassment in a workplace 
                                                
20 One might worry about my reliance on fictional cases. However, there are many cases out in the wild 
of which my analysis makes sense. Teresa Marques (2020) argues that the expression of ‘free election’ has a 
positive connotation. However, certain politicians often use the term not as a means of protecting the rights 
of citizens, but instead to manipulate people into thinking that particular ‘elections’ involve fair or just 
processes. This difference in usage constitutes a type of (unjust) power-affected metalinguistic disagreement.  
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where men are perceived as better qualified, objective, and more legitimate. When the man 
retorts, ‘Don’t be so sensitive’ it should not come as a surprise that the woman downgrades her 
self-trust, and subsequently comes to doubt the accuracy or aptness of her ‘sexual harassment’-
content pair. The man has gaslighted the woman through controlling the outcome of 
metalinguistic negotiation (ibid., 2020). 
 
What we can see is that the culturally available information of a patriarchal social environment 
corrupts epistemic judgments (Fricker 2007). Women are often, and incorrectly, perceived as 
over-sensitive, paranoid, hysterical, unreasonable, subjective, etc., which subsequently subjects 
them to persistent and pernicious challenges to their epistemic reliability (e.g., ‘Did you lead him 
on?,’ etc.). Because of this, women tend not to be believed when they testify to sexual harassment 
(or sexual assault). Thus, it is ‘fitting’ for women to downgrade their self-trust in the face of such 
challenges. It is what is expected and demanded of them, especially in a workplace where men are 
perceived as more reasonable. 
 
Going back to our example, we might begin to see how the man comes to have metalinguistic 
power over the woman. Given the social environment, the man unfairly occupies a position of 
epistemic dominance. And this owes to the identity of each speaker and the prevailing social 
stereotypes that affect coordination of cognition, affect, and practice. He is a man, and men are 
trusted sources of information. She is a woman, and women are irrational and unreliable. In sum: 
The power to affect metalinguistic disagreement is distributed unequally in society. Importantly, 
this unequal distribution is often along identity categorial lines.21 
 
5.3. Metalinguistic power, M-Peerhood, and M-Agency 
 
How does metalinguistic power relate to the discussion in §3? The presence of metalinguistic power in 
the joint activity of pairing contents with words entails non-ideal conditions. 22  When one has 
                                                
21 We might also interpret this situation as an instance of accommodation. The notion of accommodation 
has received a lot of attention in socio-political theorising (e.g., Langton and West 1999; Popa-Wyatt and 
Wyatt 2017, Langton 2018). Roughly, accommodation occurs when a speaker says something that requires 
a hearer to accept that what was said is correct play. And accommodation has been said to be responsible 
for instituting oppressive contexts. For example, McGowan (2009) argues that rules of accommodation can 
make utterances count as correct play by enacting permissibility facts. Thus, when one performs racist or 
sexist speech, one changes what is permissible to say in a ‘game of oppression.’ In the case above, what 
might be happening is that the man has performed sexist speech, which enacts permissibility facts 
responsible for constraining the moves that the woman is able to make. A full analysis of this option goes 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
22 Note that non-ideal conditions do not entail the presence of metalinguistic power.  
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metalinguistic power, one has more control in the joint activity of pairing contents with words. 
When one has more control, one is not an m-peer with their interlocutor. And when one is able 
to do more with their words, the local m-agency of the other is constrained. 
 
In the foregoing case, metalinguistic power has more to do with the degree of impression one can 
have on conversation with the performance of an m-move, rather than the types of m-moves one 
can perform. The impression of the man’s m-moves, in resolving metalinguistic negotiation, is far 
stronger than the woman’s. He is more able to profoundly impact conversational outcomes. Thus, 
the woman’s local m-agency is constrained. She is unable to perform m-moves with the same 
impression. And this constraint owes to her being a woman situated in a patriarchal social 
environment. Her words carry less weight in virtue of belonging to a particular identity group.  
 
The rest of the paper will explore the idea that when identity prejudice plays a role in 
constraining what one can achieve in metalinguistic negotiation, this constitutes a distinctive 
wrongdoing. I call this metalinguistic injustice. I will explore possible ways of understanding its 
wrong-making features. In particular, I will examine whether metalinguistic injustice is an 
epistemic injustice, a linguistic injustice, or both. 
 
6. Metalinguistic Injustice 
 
As we all probably know by now, epistemic injustice occurs when one is undermined in their 
capacity as an epistemic subject (Fricker 2007). According to Miranda Fricker, forms of epistemic 
injustice have something in common: ‘prejudicial exclusion from participation in the spread of 
knowledge’ (2007, 162). For testimonial injustice, the primary harm involves ‘exclusion from the 
pooling of knowledge owing to identity prejudice on the part of the hearer’; and the primary 
harm of hermeneutical injustice involves ‘exclusion from the pooling of knowledge owing to 
structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource’ (ibid., 162). As a general 
characterization, epistemic injustice can involve either identity prejudice in the hearer or identity 
prejudice in the production and dissemination of shared epistemic resources. 
 
I will explore whether metalinguistic injustice can be construed as involving either of these forms 
of epistemic exclusion. Further, I will examine whether metalinguistic injustice constitutes a 
linguistic injustice. This is a critically under-theorised notion. Similar to epistemic injustice, 
linguistic injustice involves identity prejudice in the hearer or identity prejudice in the production 
and dissemination of shared linguistic resources.  
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Overall, my aim will be to assess whether metalinguistic injustice constitutes (i) identity prejudice 
in the hearer or (ii) identity prejudice in the pooling of local interpretive resources. If 
metalinguistic injustice satisfies (i) or (ii), then it is either an epistemic injustice, a linguistic 
injustice, or both simultaneously.  
 
6.1. Metalinguistic Injustice as Exclusion From the Pooling of Epistemic Resources 
 
In his work on gaslighting, Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky (2020) distinguishes between two 
types: first and second order. Most important is his account of the latter. Second order gaslighting 
occurs when there is disagreement over which content should be expressed by a shared term in a 
context, and where the use of words by a speaker is apt to cause a hearer to doubt her reliability in 
virtue of doubting the accuracy of her preferred word-content pair. In other words, second order 
gaslighting occurs in non-ideal metalinguistic negotiation. 
 
According to Podosky, second order gaslighting constitutes a distinctive epistemic injustice. This 
is because there are times at which metalinguistic negotiation involves exclusion from the pooling 
of epistemic resources. However, contrary to hermeneutical injustice, the resources in question 
are not shared on a global scale. Instead, they are features of a local context.23 He argues that just 
as groups can be prevented from contributing to the set of epistemic resources shared across or 
within communities, individuals be prevented from contributing to the local epistemic resources 
of contexts such as conversation. Thus, he continues: 
 
...like groups, individuals are undermined in their capacity as an epistemic subject when this 
occurs. Thus, an epistemic subject is, inter alia, someone who is entitled to have their conceptual 
understanding given consideration in the decision as to which [content] will be expressed by a shared term 
in a context. When one is prevented from full participation in [content]-determining 
conversation, this constitutes a denial of someone’s capacity as an epistemic subject (ibid., 13). 
 
Podosky calls this metalinguistic deprivation: 
 
                                                
23  A substantive discussion of the difference between hermeneutical injustice and metalinguistic 
deprivation can be found in Podosky (2020). One thing I will note about the relationship here is that if 
metalinguistic deprivation is pervasive, this constitutes one mechanism by which dominant groups can 
control the collective hermeneutical resource, therefore contributing to hermeneutical injustice. However, 
sometimes the resources we choose in a context may deviate from dominant ones. Thus, metalinguistic 
negotiation can also be a site for resisting extant terms of epistemic engagement. 
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Metalinguistic deprivation is an epistemic injustice that occurs when one is prevented, or 
restricted, from contributing to the processes involved in determining the [content] that will 
be expressed by a word, or set of words, in a context... (ibid., 13). 
 
This doesn’t yet give us identity prejudicial exclusion. Thus, one might be sceptical that this 
constitutes an epistemic injustice. After all, there seem to be times at which one can be innocently 
restricted in their ability to contribute to content-determining conversation, such as being 
beholden to the preferred word-content pair of an expert. In other words, metalinguistic 
deprivation does not appear to be a discriminatory epistemic injustice (Fricker 2013, 1318). This 
occurs when one is undermined in their capacity as an epistemic subject owing to the operation of 
identity prejudice (Fricker 2007, 44). 
 
Anticipating this, Podosky argues that metalinguistic deprivation becomes a discriminatory 
epistemic injustice when one is restricted from content-determining conversation owing to the 
operation of ‘prejudicial stereotypes that are made salient in the context’ (2020, 13). He calls this 
discriminatory metalinguistic deprivation. 
 
We can see the presence of discriminatory metalinguistic deprivation in the case we explored 
above. The woman is unable to contribute equally to the processes that determine what will be 
expressed by ‘sexual harassment’ because she is a woman. This case represents a paradigm instance 
of metalinguistic injustice. Further, it is an instance of discriminatory metalinguistic deprivation. 
As a first pass, we might say that metalinguistic injustice is discriminatory metalinguistic 
deprivation. Call this metalinguistic injustice (EI):  
 
Metalinguistic Injustice (EI) occurs when: (i) One is entitled to contribute to the epistemic 
resources of a local context, but (ii) one is restricted in their ability to participate in the joint 
activity of pairing contents with words in virtue of (iii) the operation of metalinguistic power 
in the context.  
 
6.2. Metalinguistic Injustice as Exclusion From the Pooling of Linguistic Resources 
 
Apart from being an epistemic injustice, metalinguistic injustice may constitute a linguistic 
injustice. Following Ishani Maitra (2017), we can understand linguistic injustice in different ways. 
On one view ‘a linguistic injustice may be an injustice committed against someone in their 
capacity as a linguistic agent, e.g., a speaker or hearer... And on yet another view a linguistic 
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injustice may be unfair exclusion from a linguistic community... And there may be further 
options as well’ (2017, 288).  
 
The wrong present in some forms of non-ideal metalinguistic negotiation could be captured by 
either suggestion. Metalinguistic negotiation could be wrongful because: (1) a speaker is 
undermined in their capacity as a linguistic subject in virtue of being unable to perform certain m-
moves, or being unable to perform m-moves that leave a strong impression on conversation, or (2) 
a speaker is prevented from contributing to the pool of linguistic resources that would enable to 
them to accurately describe their experience. I will first examine (2). 
 
(2) appears to be the kind of wrong that Fricker calls hermeneutical injustice, a species of epistemic 
injustice (2007, Ch. 5). However, Maitra suggests that there are grounds for thinking that the 
injustice here is distinctively linguistic, not epistemic. The reason for this is because, owing to 
hermeneutical marginalization, the ‘agent suffering this wrong is prevented from accurately 
describing their own experience, and as a result, from communicating the nature of that experience 
to others’ (2017, 289 my emphasis). For Maitra, describing and communicating are paradigm 
linguistic capacities.24 
 
Importantly, we can connect these thoughts to our discussion above. Instead of thinking of 
metalinguistic injustice as concerning contribution to epistemic resources, we can understand it as 
concerning contribution to linguistic resources. Drawing similarities to metalinguistic injustice 
(EI), we can say that metalinguistic deprivation constitutes a linguistic injustice as follows. One 
has to be entitled to contribute to the linguistic resources of a local context (e.g. the content of 
‘sexual harassment’); one has to be restricted in their ability to contribute to the processes that 
determine the content that will be expressed by a shared word in a context (i.e. metalinguistic 
deprivation); and one must be subject to metalinguistic deprivation in virtue of the operation of 
identity prejudice in that context (i.e. metalinguistic power). When metalinguistic deprivation 
constitutes a linguistic injustice, in the sense we’ve been considering, call it metalinguistic injustice 
(LI):  
 
Metalinguistic Injustice (LI) occurs when: (i) One is entitled to contribute to the linguistic 
resources of a local context, but (ii) one is restricted in their ability to participate in the joint 
activity of pairing contents with words, in virtue of (iii) the operation of metalinguistic power 
in the context. 
                                                
24 We can say that hermeneutical injustice is both an epistemic injustice and a linguistic injustice.   
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6.3. Metalinguistic Injustice as Identity Prejudice in the Hearer: Testimonial Injustice  
 
I want to move away from thinking about the wrong of metalinguistic injustice as prejudicial 
exclusion from the pooling of resources, be it epistemic or linguistic. I will now focus on whether 
metalinguistic injustice involves identity prejudice in the hearer.  
 
For Fricker, when one’s basic epistemic capacities are undermined, this constitutes ‘epistemic 
objectification’ (2007, 132 – 133). This draws on a distinction between informants on the one 
hand, and mere sources of information on the other:  
 
Broadly speaking, informants are epistemic agents who convey information, whereas sources of 
information are states of affairs from which the inquirer may be in a position to glean 
information. Thus, while objects can only be sources of information, people can be either 
informants... or sources of information... (ibid., 132). 
 
Fricker argues that treating someone as a mere source of information constitutes epistemic 
objectification. It is a denial of epistemic agency. It is no different from treating someone like a 
tree from which we can infer information about its age by observing its rings. This implies that 
there are certain things to which epistemic subjects have a right in relation to others, such as 
receiving a fair credibility assessment. When this right is not fulfilled, one is treated as an object. 
When one suffers from epistemic objectification, one is not treated as fully human. This is the 
primary harm of testimonial injustice. 
 
Might metalinguistic injustice be construed as a testimonial injustice? The presence of 
metalinguistic power could be due to a speaker affording less credibility to another who advocates 
for an alternative word-content pair. For example, the woman who accuses the man of sexual 
harassment might not be taken seriously when she endorses a ‘sexual harassment’-content pair 
that conflicts with the pair preferred by the man. However, it is also possible that one can possess 
metalinguistic power owing to the operation of identity prejudice without a speaker being subject 
to a deflated credibility assessment. For instance, a marginalized speaker might have internalized 
pernicious stereotypes about their own reliability, and thus doubt themselves and their preferred 
word-content pairs. Given this, the marginalized speaker might limit their speech in 
metalinguistic negotiation. Consequently, the hearer gains metalinguistic power. Yet, the 
testimony of the speaker isn’t given an unfair credibility assessment since little testimony was 
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given.25 Thus, metalinguistic injustice can occur without testimonial injustice. Metalinguistic 
injustice is not testimonial injustice. 
 
6.4. Metalinguistic Injustice as Identity Prejudice in the Hearer: Linguistic Objectification  
 
The claim that the primary harm of testimonial injustice is epistemic objectification has its critics. 
José Medina argues that one can be treated as an informant and still be undermined as an 
epistemic subject, such as when an informant is not treated as an inquirer (2012, 203 – 204). 
Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. (2014) argues that it is unintuitive to think of the primary harm of epistemic 
injustice as a kind objectification since some forms of epistemic injustice structurally depend on 
the epistemic subjectivity of a speaker (Pohlhaus Jr. 2014, 103). Aiden McGlynn (2019) argues 
that the main problem with Fricker’s account is that it seems that when one perpetrates epistemic 
injustice, they are not treating someone as lacking epistemic agency in the sense of a mere source 
of information. 
 
Despite these concerns, McGlynn contends that Fricker’s account of epistemic objectification is 
stronger than most critics assume. In an attempt to save Fricker’s account, McGlynn suggests that 
we should look more closely at Nussbaum’s (1995) seven ways of treating someone as an object 
(ibid., 12). I won’t spend time listing them here. Nevertheless, McGlynn argues that if Fricker 
expands her notion of objectification she can accommodate the cases that have troubled her. 
 
McGlynn’s insight helps to understand another plausible means of construing the wrong of 
metalinguistic injustice as linguistic injustice, which brings us to (1). Instead of metalinguistic 
injustice being a form of epistemic objectification, we can think of it as a form of linguistic 
objectification. What is linguistic objectification? 
 
A first guess is that it is the denial of an agent’s capacity to do certain things with words. One is 
linguistically objectified when one loses control over exercising basic linguistic capacities, such as 
describing one’s experience, communicating experiences across social space, being the receiver of 
experiential information, performing certain actions with an utterance, etc. It isn’t hard to 
recognize these capacities as fundamentally and distinctively human (Hornsby and Langton 1998, 
37). They enable speakers to convey information across social space, which undergirds 
coordination of thought, talk, and practice; all of which are paramount for one to flourish in a 
                                                
25 This idea is similar to Kristie Dotson’s (2011) notion of testimonial smothering. Another closely related 
idea is Podosky’s notion of perspectival subversion (2020, 16).  
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highly social world (ibid., 37). Thus, when one’s linguistic capacities are restricted, one is 
undermined as a linguistic subject.  
 
Understood in this sense, linguistic objectification comes close to Nussbaum’s (1995) notion of 
inertness; one of her seven forms of objectification. The objectifier treats the subject as lacking 
agency; for my purposes, linguistic agency. This is on the right track, however it admits cases that 
seem unintuitive. A classroom rule of ‘no swearing’ prevents students from saying curse words. 
This looks like a non-problematic denial of agency. Thus, in order for linguistic objectification to 
constitute linguistic injustice, we might say that one has to lose control over their words under 
certain conditions. In particular, we might say that linguistic objectification occurs when one loses 
control of their words owing to identity prejudice. And there appear to be clear examples of this in 
existing literature. 
 
Consider silencing. This refers to the systematic interference with communicative capabilities of a 
speaker in conversation (McGowan 2017, 39). It is generally agreed that problematic forms of 
silencing involve a causal connection between one’s disadvantaged social identity and one’s 
(in)ability to exercise basic linguistic capacities. Which capacities or capabilities are undermined 
in a context depends on the nature of the situation.   
 
One might not have the capacity to perform certain speech acts. This is called illocutionary 
disablement. In such cases, a speaker utters words yet those words fail to constitute an intended 
action. Langton and Hornsby (1998) argue that this kind of silencing owes to a communicative 
interference that constitutes uptake failure. For example, in a social environment in which men 
are heavily influenced by pornography, women are often unable to perform the act of refusing sex 
since ‘no’ is taken up as ‘yes’ by men.26 The wrong lies in the systematic failure of members of one 
identity group to recognise the illocutionary intentions of members of another identity group 
owing to being situated in a particular social environment. 
 
Another way that linguistic capacities might be unfairly affected is through perlocutionary frustration 
(Langton 1993). This occurs when a speaker successfully pulls off a speech act, yet the speech act 
fails to have its intended effect on conversation. Continuing with our example, consider a woman 
who refuses sex and a man recognises her illocutionary intention yet fails to take seriously the 
implications of this act. The refusal is successful, but its intended effect is frustrated. She is 
                                                
26 For others who have similar, yet competing views about illocutionary silencing, see Maitra (2009), 
Kukla (2014), Hesni (2018).   
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denied an outcome on conversation to which she is entitled. 27 The wrong lies in the systematic 
failure of members of one identity group to respect the communicative implications of the speech 
of members of another identity group owing to being situated in a particular social environment. 
 
We, as humans, are entitled to exercise certain linguistic capacities, whether illocutionary or 
perlocutionary. This constitutes (part of) our linguistic agency. When such capacities are 
undermined owing to the operation of identity prejudice, this constitutes linguistic 
objectification. And, linguistic objectification is the primary harm of linguistic injustice. We 
might ask: Does linguistic objectification ever occur in non-ideal metalinguistic negotiation? 
 
Consider the exchange over the ‘sexual harassment’-content pair. As discussed, the man has 
metalinguistic power over the woman. Specifically, the woman cannot perform m-moves with 
same impression as the man, subsequently having less influence over the word-content pair that 
will be operative in the context. The woman cannot (fully) exercise particular metalinguistic 
capacities. She cannot leave her desired mark on conversation. Put differently, she suffers from a 
form of perlocutionary frustration at the level of metalinguistic discourse. Further, she cannot 
exercise such capacities in virtue of being a woman. Identity prejudice plays a role in what the 
woman can do with her words in metalinguistic negotiation. Thus, she suffers from linguistic 
objectification. There is a causal connection between the speaker’s disadvantaged social identity 
and her (in)ability to exercise certain metalinguistic capacities. Call this metalinguistic injustice 
(LI*). 
 
Metalinguistic Injustice (LI*) occurs when a speaker suffers from linguistic objectification 
owing to the operation of metalinguistic power in a context. 
 
Metalinguistic injustice (LI*) is not simply preventing someone from performing certain 
metalinguistic speech acts; it is not just illocutionary disablement. Metalinguistic injustice (LI*) 
includes cases in which one can perform a desired speech act, but nevertheless fail to leave a 
strong impression with the performance of this act. Metalinguistic Injustice (LI*) is often an 
instance of perlocutionary frustration.  
 
                                                
27 McGowan (2017) identifies three (additional) ways in which one might suffer from this kind of 
communicative interference in refusal cases. A hearer might fail to recognize: (i) the authority of a speaker, 
(ii) that the speaker is sincere, or (iii) the speaker’s ‘true feelings’ (2017, 47 – 50). And there may be further 
possibilities too.  
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A final note about metalinguistic injustice (LI*). Unlike metalinguistic (EI) and (LI), which 
depend on the aim of completing metalinguistic negotiation in order to determine the epistemic 
or linguistic resources of a context, metalinguistic injustice (LI*) can occur without this aim. It 
simply involves one suffering linguistic objectification at the metalinguistic level, whether or not 
the goal is to settle on the content that will be expressed by a word in a context. 
 
I want to end this section by saying that metalinguistic injustice could, and perhaps does, involve 
all what has been suggested. Metalinguistic injustice is either metalinguistic injustice (EI), (LI), 




The foregoing had two aims. First, it set out to explain the kinematics of non-ideal metalinguistic 
disagreement. I argued that speakers are often not peers in metalinguistic negotiation, and/or at 
least one speaker lacks a certain degree of metalinguistic agency. 
 
Second, the paper explicated a distinctive wrong that occurs in non-ideal metalinguistic 
disagreements where there is a power differential owing to the operation of identity prejudice in a 
context. I called this metalinguistic injustice. I argued that we can think of metalinguistic injustice in 
three ways: (1) as an epistemic injustice that occurs when one is restricted in participating in the 
joint activity of determining the available epistemic resources, (2) as a linguistic injustice that 
occurs when one is restricted in participating in the joint activity of determining the available 
linguistic resources, or (3) as a linguistic injustice that occurs when one is unable to exercise 
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